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Some NASA details
 NASA includes:
» 20,000 civil servant employees
» 55,000 on-site and near-site contractors
» At least 25,000 Additional partners world-wide
 NASA’s system/application landscape includes:
» 3,000 applications, most built in-house
» Mission control, research labs, product fabrication, more
» Every flavor of every operating system, hardware, software…. 
 Historically, NASA has been:
» Highly decentralized
» Autonomous Centers with a B-to-B network infrastructure
» Characterized by weak CIO governance
 HSPD-12 helped us:
» Implement a robust Identity, Credential, and Access 
Management Architecture
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ICAM Overview @ NASA
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Identity Management and Account 
eXchange (IdMAX) – Single Authoritative 
source of all NASA identities
IdMAX manages issuance of PIV credentials, 
RSA Tokens, AD accounts, and Launchpad 
Accounts.
ICAM Audit Viewer allows 
us to track every change 
made to a person.
IdMAX manages account 
request and approval for 
NASA applications, and 
automatically provisions to 
the Launchpad.
NASA’s Consolidated 
Active Directory (NCAD) 
controls access to 
desktops and applications 
such as e-mail and 
SharePoint.
The Access Launchpad
provides access control for 
web-based applications.
The Agency RSA 
infrastructure supports 
applications that cannot 
use PIV smartcards.
The Enterprise Physical Access Control 
System (EPACS) controls access to 
buildings and doors throughout NASA.
Identity vs. Credential
Life Cycle Management
 A Credential Is Not an Identity – It Is Used 
To Assert A Represented Identity
 An Individual May Have Multiple Credentials
 Identity and Credential Life Cycle Events 
May Be But Are Not Necessarily Coincident
» Replaced Credential vs. Relationship Change
 Effective Identity Management Critical to 
Fair Information Practice Principles
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Credential Identifiers
 PIV – FASC-N
» Federal Agency Smart Credential Number
• Defined and assigned by U.S. Federal Agencies
» Place holder for GUID
 PIV-I – GUID/UUID
» FASC-N May Not Be Used
» GUID is defined by RFC 4122
 Parallel Person IDentifier – PPID
» Pair Wise IDPs Cross-Link Person IDs
» RFC 4122 Ideal for Person IDs
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Logical Access Management 
PIV Enablement Strategy
 Provide Central Authentication and 
Authorization (A&A) Service
» PIV-enable the A&A service
» Applications integrate with the A&A 
service, not directly to PIV
 A&A Service supports credentials at all 
levels of assurance
» Applications can use mixed sets of 
credentials according to system needs 
and users’ capabilities
» Users get Single Sign-on benefit
6December 7, 2010
Authentication & Authorization
Service Description
March 4, 2010 7ICAM at NASA
Physical Access Management 
PIV Enablement Strategy
 Enterprise Physical Access Control System 
(EPACS) Operational At NASA Since 2005
» All NASA Centers Use A Common 
EPACS System Provisioned From IdMAX
» Building/Door Readers Have Been 
Converted To Read PIV Smartcards
8December 7, 2010
PACS Architecture
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Trust Ecosystem
 Draft National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace – NSTIC
» http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ns_tic.pdf
 Trusted Framework Adoption Process For 
Levels of Assurance 1, 2, and non-PKI 3
» http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/TrustFrameworkProviderAdoptionProcess.pdf
 Identity Scheme Adoption Process
» http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/IdentitySchemeAdoptionProcess.pdf
 Open Identity Solutions for Open Government
» http://www.idmanagement.gov/drilldown.cfm?action=openID_openGOV
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PKI Trust Governance For 
Non-Federal Issuers (NFIs)
 The Federal Bridge Certification Authority 
(FBCA) Certifies NFIs For Use By Federal 
Relying Parties For LOA 3 (PKI) and LOA 4
 The FBCA Certificate Policy (CP) Contains 
The Detailed Requirements That Those 
NFIs Must Meet
 There Is No Intent Or Expectation For Trust 
By U.S. Federal Departments And Agencies 
Of Cards Or Tokens Where Certificates Are 
Issued Outside The Federal PKI Policy 
Authority
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PKI in the Trust Ecosystem
 Emerging Threats to Online Trust: The Role 
of Public Policy and Browser Certificates
 Use of PKI for PIV and PIV-I
 Use of PKI for exchanging Federation 
Metadata
 Use of PKI by Commercial SSPs for PKI 
Tokens
 Trust anchors – largely unmanaged by RPs
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PIV Cards
 Personal Identification Verification Cards
» Cornerstone Electronic Credential In U.S. Federal 
Government Used In Authentication To Both 
Information Resources And Facilities
» In HSPD-12 U.S. Federal Departments And 
Agencies Are Required To Issue PIV Cards to 
Permanent Government Personal And Contractors
» Issued ONLY By U.S. Federal Entities
» Is Relied On By U.S. Federal And Non-Federal 
Entities
» Background Investigation – Minimum NACI
» Assert Federal Common Policy Framework 
(FCPF) Certificate Policy OIDs for PIV
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PIV-I … PIV Interoperable Cards
 Personal Identification Verification – Interoperable (by 
Non-Federal Issuers – NFI) Cards
» Cornerstone Credential For All Security Controls For 
Both Information Resources And Facilities 
Protection
» Intended Primarily For Issuance By Non-Federal 
Entities
» May Be Relied On By Federal And Non-federal 
Entities
» Identity and Affiliation Certainty Equivalent to PIV
» No Issuer Background Investigation of Cardholders
» Asserts Federal Bridge Certificate Authority (FBCA) 
Certificate Policy OIDs for PIV-I
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Multi-Factor Tokens
Alternate Form Factor - PIV
 Facility Access Cards – may be equivalent 
card issuance and technical interoperability to 
PIV-I where local policy states a deliberate 
position against interoperability through the 
trust ecosystem
 Non-card form factor smartcard technology
 Micro-SD which is electronically equivalent to 
PIV combined with PDA using NFC (Near field 
Communication) for both LACS and PACS
 Trusted by U.S. Federal If Certificates Issued 
Under FBCA Certificate Policy – MediumHW
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Derived Credentials
 The Binding Of A Secondary Credential At 
End-user Activation To An Identity Based On 
Verification Of A Direct Issued Credential
 Why Is This Important?
 It Will Allow Strong Identity Binding For 
Alternate Form Factor And Pseudonym 
Credentials For A Myriad Of Purposes
 The Binding Of A Derived Secondary 
Credential May Be At The Same Or Lower 
Level Of Assurance
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What We Do Today @ NASA
 Smartcard Login To The Desktop With Access 
To Over 565 Applications Without Additional 
Logon Prompts
 Any NASA Worker Can Visit Any NASA Center:
» Pre-authorized Access To Any Building/Room
» Wireless Access To The NASA Network
 Ensure On A Person-by-person Basis That 
Those Who Need IT Security Training Have 
Taken It
 Provide “Basic Level Of Entitlement” Access To 
IT Systems Based On Identity Attributes
 Initiate “Close Account” Processes On 91% Of 
Our IT Assets When Someone Leaves
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Cool Stuff We’re Planning
 Establish A Non-PIV Smartcard (Multi-factor Token) For 
Use By Temporary Workers And Others
» Allows Us To Lock IT Systems Down To Smartcard-
only
 Assign A Level Of Risk To Each Access Role In Our IT 
Systems
» Automatic Comparison Of Level Of Risk Of The Asset 
To Level Of Confidence In A Person
» Allows Early Access To Low-risk Systems, While 
Protecting Our Higher-risk Systems
 Link Training Requirements To Each Access Role
» Automatic Check Against Our Training System To 
Ensure Proper Training For The Role Has Been 
Completed
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What Does This All Mean?
 It Means Relying Parties (RPs) Are In Control
 RPs Decide If
» Assurance Levels Provide Sufficient Granularity 
» Certificate Policies Provide Sufficient Granularity
» Issuer (Name) Constraints Are Required
» To Accept Alternate Form Factors (HW & SW)
 There Are Ample Controls In The Trust Framework For 
RPs To Admit Only Authorized Accesses
 Bottom Line – A Card Or Token With Certificates 
Assert A Certificate Policy That The RP Can Map To 
Access Privileges
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Lessons Learned
 Look at PIV enablement in the context of a robust ICAM 
architecture
» Access Management doesn’t work if Identity and Credential 
Management aren’t working
» PIV enablement doesn’t work for people who don’t have 
PIV smartcards
» …or can’t use them
 Implement a “killer app” to jumpstart adoption
 Scorecards seem mean…but they tend to work
 Communications, communications, communications!
» Most people don’t get ICAM
» Sell Security on how fast you can get bad guys out
» Sell the application owner on ease of account management
» Sell the user on Single Sign On
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How can you increase your ICAM value?
Tim.Baldridge@nasa.gov
BACK-UP SLIDES
Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs)
 http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm 
 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_p
olicyguide_2008-01.pdf
 Eight core principles of privacy protection: 
1. Transparency 
2. Individual Participation
3. Purpose Specification
4. Data Minimization 
5. Use Limitation 
6. Data Quality and Integrity 
7. Security 
8. Accountability and Auditing 
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Normative PIV-I Reference 
Documents
 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/FBCA_CP_RFC3647.pdf
 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/pivi_certificate_crl_profile.pdf
 http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/PIV_IO_NonFed_Issuers.pdf
 http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/PIV-I_FAQ.pdf
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-63-rev1/SP800-63-Rev1_Dec2008.pdf
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FBCA Supplementary Antecedent, 
In-Person Definition 
 An Antecedent event is an in-person 
proofing event that occurred previously and 
may suffice as meeting the in-person 
identity proofing requirements. 
 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/FBCA_Supplementary_Antecedent.pdf
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FBCA CP 3.2.3.1 Authentication of Human 
Subscribers (Medium Assurance)
 Identity shall be established by in-person proofing before the Registration 
Authority, Trusted Agent or an entity certified by a State or Federal Entity as 
being authorized to confirm identities; information provided shall be verified 
to ensure legitimacy. A trust relationship between the Trusted Agent and the 
applicant which is based on an in-person antecedent may suffice as meeting 
the in-person identity proofing requirement. Credentials required are one 
Federal Government-issued Picture I.D., one REAL ID Act compliant picture 
ID, or two Non-Federal Government I.D.s, one of which shall be a photo I.D. 
(e.g., Non-REAL ID Act compliant Drivers License). Any credentials 
presented must be unexpired. 
 Clarification on the trust relationship between the Trusted Agent and the 
applicant, which is based on an in-person antecedent identity proofing 
event, can be found in the “FBCA Supplementary Antecedent, In-Person 
Definition” document. 
 For PIV-I, credentials required are two identity source documents in 
original form. The identity source documents must come from the list 
of acceptable documents included in Form I-9, OMB No. 1115-0136, 
Employment Eligibility Verification. At least one document shall be a 
valid State or Federal Government-issued picture identification (ID). 
For PIV-I, the use of an in-person antecedent is not applicable. 
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